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Abstract
We consider a model of insurance and collusion. Efficient risk sharing requires the consumer to
get a monetary compensation in case of a loss. But this in turn implies consumer–provider collusion
incentives to submit false claims to the insurer. We assume, however, that only some providers are
collusive while some are honest, and determine the optimal contract specifying the treatment, the
insurance policy and the reimbursement policy to the provider. Two cases are analyzed: the first
allows contract menus that induce self-selection among the providers; the second allows contracts
consisting of a single policy. In both cases, deterrence of collusion is optimal only if the probability
that the provider is collusive is large. When the contract deters collusion, it is as if the provider
was collusive with probability one. The first best is achieved only when the provider is honest with
certainty. Furthermore, over-consumption of treatment occurs in many cases, and is sometimes used
as a substitute for monetary compensation to the consumer.
© 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Insurance policies cover consumers for the losses they may suffer due to an accident. The
moral hazard problem associated with insurance is well known. Because the true state of the
loss may be hard to verify, instead of the indemnity approach, insurance policies often cover
fully or partially the expenses consumers may have to insure to recover some of the losses.
In disability insurance, the problem is compounded by the potential loss of income after an
illness or accident. Disability and health insurance policies are very often simultaneously
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offered by employers. Here, the moral hazard problem becomes more extensive: not only
is there a potential for consumers to use medical care excessively, consumers and providers
may misreport the extent of injury in order to collect disability insurance payments. In this
paper, we study the collusion between consumers and providers in the context of health and
disability insurance.1
In our model, a risk-averse consumer may become ill, and suffer some health loss as well
as income loss due to disability. A provider can partially restore these losses by supplying
treatment. Insurance is offered by a risk-neutral insurer by means of contracts with the con-
sumer and the provider. These contracts specify payments from the insurer to the provider,
from the consumer to the insurer, as well as the amount of treatment. Because treatment
only partially recovers the loss, efficient insurance requires a monetary compensation to the
consumer.
Whether a loss has actually occurred or not is nonverifiable information, and payments
and recovery inputs can only be based on the claim that the insurer receives. In considering
how claims are filed, we use a new approach and let some economic agents act honestly.
While some providers and consumers may collude to defraud the insurer of disability pay-
ments, some do not: these provider–consumer coalitions will report truthfully the private
information of the loss.2 The assumption that some providers behave honestly is motivated
by several considerations. First, an economic agent may have made a conscious decision
to be honest, concluding that the potential gain from lying may not be worthwhile. This
is supported by several theoretical findings in the literature. The repeated-game literature
has explained “sincere” or “altruistic” behavior as optimal responses in long-term inter-
actions. This of course cannot explain all types of cooperation, in particular those that
occur in short-term relationships. But honest behavior may also be optimal in short-term
relationships.3 An agent may have such a distaste for misreporting the truth that he will
forgo any potential gain.
Second, a number of papers have suggested that human behavior is driven by factors other
than pure selfishness. Surveying the psychology literature, Rabin (1998) concludes that the
standard assumption of selfish behavior in economics may be too narrow, and sometimes
even misleading. Extensive experimental evidence in bargaining games has demonstrated
that a notion of fairness determines behavior (see Rabin, 1998, p. 21ff). Rabin also quotes
the example, originally due to Dawes and Thaler (1988), of farmers leaving fresh produce
on a table with a box nearby, expecting customers to pick their purchases and leave money
to “complete” the transaction. Similarly, most of us have voluntarily paid for newspapers
inside an unlocked box on a sidewalk. In a paper on endogenous preferences, Bowles
(1998, p. 80) “treat[s] preferences as cultural traits, or learned influences of behavior” and
includes such examples as never lying and reciprocating dinner invitations. Taken together,
1 Clearly, our model applies to any environment in which an accident leads to both injury and loss of income,
such as home and automobile insurance. We have chosen to use the health and disability example because it
illustrates the situation most succinctly.
2 Ma and McGuire (1997) also study claims as a result of collusion between the provider and the consumer, but
assumes that there are only collusive provider types.
3 In a model where an agent is matched with a new principal each period, Tirole (1996) determines the optimal
behavior of opportunistic agents, who co-exist with agents who always cheat and agents who never cheat. He
shows that under some conditions, an opportunistic agent maximizes his utility by never cheating the principal.
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these findings strongly indicate that honest behavior is neither uncommon nor irrational. In
the tax compliance and evasion literature, it has been recognized that some taxpayers are
always honest; Erard and Feinstein (1994) have studied the impact of this.
Our approach does not assume that economic agents are nonstrategic. Although honest
providers always truthfully file claims with the insurer, they seek to maximize profits,
subject to the truthful report of the loss. We have thought about an alternative assumption:
that some agents are completely nonstrategic, honestly reporting the health status, as well
as always performing any task that is asked of them to do (for example, returning any rent or
payoffs above their reservation utility level). We believe that this second assumption is too
strong, and hard to justify empirically. Moreover, a consumer’s health status has a certain
objective connotation, being a piece of information that is potentially verifiable; in fact, we
will exploit this property in setting up the collusion subgame between the consumer and
the provider. On the other hand, an agent’s intention is impossible to ascertain objectively;
even under the best of circumstances, one’s intention may not be inferred accurately.
We determine the equilibrium insurance and provider payment contracts. As a bench-
mark, we first assume that the insurer can observe whether the provider is honest or not. If
he is honest, the first best is implementable. If he is collusive, the contract is second-best:
consumers must bear some risk. Interestingly, the provider does not get any rent: collusion is
deterred by eliminating the monetary compensation to the consumer when a loss is claimed.
In fact, the treatment is used as a substitute for monetary compensation: it is larger than the
first-best level.
When the insurer cannot observe whether the provider is honest or not, we consider the
general class of deterministic contracts, each of which consists of a menu of insurance and
payment policies and recovery inputs. However, the common methodology of solving for
the equilibrium by maximizing an objective function under a set of truth-telling constraints
is no longer valid. Indeed, a resource-allocation mechanism that exploits the honesty of
economic agents must let those who behave strategically succeed in “gaming” against the
system. For completeness, we show in Lemma 1 that some equilibrium allocations cannot
be implemented by collusion-proof contracts.4 Therefore, we must consider two distinct
classes of contracts: those which deter collusion, and those which do not. Interestingly, the
optimal collusion-proof contract is independent of the likelihood of the provider’s type, and
identical to the equilibrium policy in a model where the provider is known to be collusive
always (Proposition 2).5
This clearly demonstrates that deterring collusion cannot be always optimal. For example,
when the likelihood of a collusive provider is very small, a first-best contract, which is not
collusion-proof, must perform better. Nevertheless, we show that the first-best contract is not
an equilibrium contract even when the provider is almost always honest. Indeed, in Propo-
sition 3, we characterize the optimal noncollusion-proof contract for any given distribution
4 An honest provider always forgoes any gain from information manipulation. A contract allowing collusion,
therefore, rewards only the collusive type. Therefore, equilibrium allocations that reward the two types of provider
differently must imply equilibrium collusion.
5 The intuition is easy to understand. When faced with a collusion-proof policy, a collusive provider will not
gain from misreporting the loss information. This implies that even if a collusive provider picks a policy that is
meant for the honest provider, there will not be any gain from misreporting. So the policy for the honest provider
must also be collusion-proof.
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on the provider’s type. Collusion takes the form of the provider–consumer coalition always
claiming that a loss has occurred. This leads to a waste in recovery inputs and rents for the
provider. The optimal noncollusion-proof policy for the honest provider implements exces-
sive recovery inputs as a substitute for monetary compensation; for the collusive provider,
insufficient inputs are used, because they are wasted with some probability. Risk sharing
for the consumer is never perfect. More importantly, when compared to the first best, the
distortion in the honest provider’s policy varies strictly monotonically with the probability
of the honest provider, and tends to zero as this probability tends to one. This contrasts with
the optimal collusion-proof contract, which is independent of the probability. Combining
these results, we conclude that if the probability of a collusive provider is small, equilibrium
contracts allow collusion. Conversely, if this probability is large, the equilibrium contracts
must be collusion-proof.
Equilibria in our model may remain at the usual second best (which obtains when eco-
nomic agents are always strategic), or it may be better, but never first best. Whenever equilib-
ria are better than the second best, the (strategic) provider and the consumer misreport their
private information in equilibrium. Equilibria tend to the first best as the probability of the
provider being honest goes to one, but whenever this probability is within a neighborhood
of zero, equilibria do not change with the probability and are second best.
Our analysis of side-contracts follows Tirole’s innovation (Tirole, 1986), but adds the
assumption that the provider may not always be willing to manipulate information. Hence,
the method of considering only collusion-proof equilibria does not apply. Recently, Ma
and McGuire (1997) study the effect of collusion on payment and insurance contracts. The
model there is quite different, allowing the provider to choose efforts and the consumer to
choose quantities. More importantly, in Ma and McGuire (1997) the consumer and provider
cannot write any side contract, and collusion may not always maximize their joint surplus.
Kofman and Lawarrée (1996) and Tirole (1992) also study models with collusion where
some economic agent may not be corrupt. In both papers, it is assumed that the principal
offers a single contract; in contrast we allow for a menu of contracts. We find that the
contracts meant for the honest and the dishonest provider are different whenever collusion
is not deterred. Our results can, therefore, be interpreted to imply that the analyses of Kofman
and Lawarrée and Tirole involve a loss of generality.
Alger and Renault (1998, 2000) consider a principal-agent model (without collusion)
in which the agent has private information about the surplus generated by the economic
exchange with principal (the circumstances). The agent either discloses the information to
the principal honestly or he must be induced to do so. Alger and Renault (1998) is closest
to the present paper in that two periods are considered: the agent knows only his ethics in
the first period and learns the circumstances in the second period.6 In the first period, the
principal offers a menu of contracts that specify allocations as a function of the circumstances
announced by the agent in the second period. Some of our results are similar to theirs: in both
papers, the standard second-best contract is optimal when dishonest behavior is sufficiently
likely, and ethics are truthfully revealed in the first period; moreover, it is optimal to let
6 Alger and Renault (2000) allow for contracts in which the agent announces his ethics and the circumstances
simultaneously; they also consider three alternative definitions of honesty, depending on whether the honest agent
honestly reveals his ethics or not.
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the dishonest type lie in equilibrium when honest behavior is sufficiently likely. This is
comforting since it indicates that these results are robust. However, our findings differ for
the contracts offered when honest behavior is sufficiently likely. They find that the first-best
contract is offered to the honest agent (and to the dishonest agent if the principal’s utility
does not directly depend on the agent’s type, as is the case here). In contrast, we find that
the honest and dishonest providers are offered different contracts; moreover, these contracts
are never first best. The reason behind this difference will be explained in the text.
The next section presents the model and the first best; we also define the side-contract and
the extensive form. The analysis is presented in Section 3. First, we define a collusion-proof
policy, and show that generally both collusion-proof and noncollusion-proof policies must
be considered. The following two subsections, respectively, consider contracts that deter
and permit collusion. Our main results are also presented there. For completeness, in Section
4, we derive the optimal contract when menus are unavailable. We show that this involves
a loss of generality. Finally, concluding remarks are made in the last section. Proofs are
contained in the appendix unless otherwise stated.
2. The model
We study the design of contracts between an insurer, a provider and a consumer. We
begin by presenting the basic setting and the first best. Then we define the side-contracting
subgame played by the provider and the consumer, as well as the extensive form of the game
played by the three parties. Our model is quite general, but because its application to health
and automobile insurance is straightforward, often we illustrate our model by these markets.7
The consumer suffers a loss with probability p. The loss can be due to an illness (as in the
health insurance case) or an accident (the automobile insurance case). We express the loss in
monetary terms and denote it by . There are, thus, two possible states of nature.8 We use the
index i = h, s to denote them: i = s is the state when the consumer’s loss is , otherwise, i =
h. In the health-care market, a consumer may suffer from some symptoms. If those symptoms
are actually insignificant, the true state of nature is h (the “healthy” state); otherwise, the
state is s (the “sick” state). In the automobile insurance market, the states of nature refer to
whether an accident has actually led to a loss. The consumer is risk averse with an increasing
and strictly concave utility function U , defined in terms of money. Her initial wealth is W .
The provider has a technology that recovers some of the consumer’s loss if that has oc-
curred. The recovery technology is, however, completely unproductive when the consumer
has not experienced a loss. Let m denote the input. In the health market, m denotes the
quantity of treatment; in the automobile market, the repair work. Each unit of the input m
costs the provider c. The output is measured in monetary units through the function f , where
f is increasing and strictly concave. We assume that f is bounded from above, and that
maxf (m) < ; in other words, the technology cannot completely recover the consumer’s
total loss . Many situations fit this assumption. This is certainly true for illnesses that may
7 See Lu (1997) for an example of evidence of misreporting in the health care sector.
8 We will introduce another set of states later; they concern the strategic interaction between a consumer and a
provider.
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lead to disability and loss of income. Moreover, consumers may not be able to recover
fully from some illnesses. For the automobile market, it reflects the inconvenience caused
by a repair of the car after an accident, the time and effort required to find a replacement,
or the unavoidable risk that a repair might have been done improperly.9 We assume that
the recovery input is verifiable information, and that it can be specified in a contract. The
provider is risk neutral, but has limited liability; we normalize his reservation profit to 0.
An insurer offers a policy comprising insurance for the consumer and a reimbursement
scheme for the provider. The policy specifies a transfer ti from the consumer to the in-
surer, a transfer αi from the insurer to the provider, and the amount of recovery input m.
An insurance-reimbursement policy can, thus, be denoted by {(αh, th); (αs, ts,m)}. If the
consumer suffers a loss, and pays an amount t in order to obtain m units of recovery, her
utility is U(W −  + f (m) − t); if there is no loss and the consumer pays t , her utility is
U(W − t). If the provider supplies m units of recovery in return for a remuneration α, his
utility is α −mc. We suppose that the provider can always refuse to serve the consumer, in
which case he obtains his reservation utility. The risk-neutral insurer is assumed to operate
in a competitive market, and to set its policy to maximize the consumer’s expected utility.
In the first best, whether the consumer has suffered the loss  is verifiable information,
and a contract can be based on that. The first best is denoted by {(α∗h , t∗h ); (α∗s , t∗s ,m∗)}, and
is the solution to the following program: choose αh, αs, th, ts and m to maximize
(1 − p)U(W − th)+ pU(W − + f (m)− ts),
subject to
αh ≥ 0,
αs − mc ≥ 0,
(1 − p)(th − αh)+ p(ts − αs) ≥ 0.
The first two constraints are the participation constraints for the provider, and the third one
is the insurer’s budget constraint. Trivially, the insurer sets αh = 0 and αs = mc. Then,
straightforward calculation from the first-order conditions yields:
t∗h = t∗s + − f (m∗), (1)
f ′(m∗) = c. (2)
The first condition says that all risks are absorbed by the insurer. The second is the productive
efficiency condition: the marginal benefit of recovery f ′(m∗) is equal to the marginal cost
c. Because  > f (m∗), the consumer’s payment in the event of a loss is lower: t∗h > t
∗
s .
10
Having established the first best, we proceed to study the interaction between the provider
and the consumer when they can manipulate the information about the consumer’s loss.
While the information about the true state of nature may be obtained at a cost, frequently the
insurer relies on the information reported by the provider or the insured. This is clearly the
9 Alternatively, we can assume that the marginal cost of recovery, c, is sufficiently high.
10 Alternatively, one can interpret this lesser payment in the event of a loss as a refund of the premium. That is,
the consumer pays the premium th upfront, and if there is a loss, th − ts part of the payment will be refunded.
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case in the health-care market; although medical records are available and potentially can
be used to settle disputes and law suits, almost always a provider simply submits a claim
on behalf of the consumer to complete the financial transactions due to the treatments.
As we noted in the previous section, the economic relationship between a provider and
a consumer may develop in an uncertain way: while some providers may collude with
consumers, others may not. For our purpose of analyzing the effects of collusion, it is
unimportant to model explicitly the reasons behind this, although one can easily think
of a number of reasons. For example, there may be a chance that collusion results in
a prosecution and penalty, and due to differences in wealth or opportunity costs, some
providers find collusion unattractive. Alternatively, some providers may have developed a
long-term relationship with the insurer and care more about their reputation.
The provider is, therefore, either truthful or collusive; denote these types by the index
j = τ and σ , respectively. The type of the provider is not observable by the insurer. The
probability that a provider is collusive is θ . For simplicity, we assume that the consumer
colludes whenever the provider is willing to. A truthful provider always submits a truthful
report about the consumer’s loss. By contrast, a collusive provider may agree to submit a
false claim through a side-contract with the consumer, which we now define:
Definition 1 (The side-contract subgame). A side-contract is an offer (x, k) made by the
provider to the consumer, where x is a transfer from the consumer to the provider, and k,
k = h, s, is the report. If the consumer accepts the side-contract, report k is made, and the
transfer x is paid by the consumer to the provider. Otherwise, the true state of nature is
reported.
Observe that any party in the side-contract subgame can unilaterally enforce truthful
reporting. If the true state is i, the provider can simply offer the consumer a transfer of
0 and a report of i; likewise, a consumer can always reject a side-contract offer from the
provider, and the true state will be reported. Hence, for the consumer and provider to agree
on a (nontrivial) side-contract, both of them must be at least as well off as when reporting
the true state.11
The transfer allows the provider–consumer coalition to maximize their joint surplus. To
illustrate, suppose that the true state is h. If they report the true state, the joint surplus is
αh − th; if they report s, it becomes αs − mc − ts. Note that since treatment is verifiable, it
is carried out although it has no value to the consumer. Suppose that
αs − mc − ts > αh − th. (3)
Then there must exist an x such that
th − ts ≥ x ≥ αh − αs + mc,
one of the inequalities being strict. Both parties can be made better off by the following side-
contract: they report k = s and the consumer pays x to the provider, where −ts − x ≥ −th,
and αs −mc+ x ≥ αh. Since the provider makes the side-contract offer, he can extract the
11 As a tie-breaking rule, we assume that if neither the provider nor the consumer gains strictly by misreporting
the state, the true state is reported.
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whole surplus generated by the misreporting. Thus, if (3) holds, the provider offers a side-
contract with the transfer x = th− ts, implying a net payoff αs−mc+ th− ts to the provider.
To complete the description of the setting, we define the extensive form of the game played
by the insurer, the consumer, and the provider. In stage 1, the consumer is randomly matched
with a provider and “nature” determines the type of the provider; with probability θ the
provider is a collusive type. The insurer offers an insurance-payment contract to the provider.
We will consider two cases: first, the contract contains two policies for the provider to choose
between; second, it consists of one single policy. In stage 2, the provider picks a policy (we
will describe this stage in more detail later). In stage 3, the consumer suffers the loss 
with probability p. Whether the consumer has suffered this loss becomes the consumer’s
and the provider’s private information. In stage 4, the provider and the consumer play the
side-contract subgame if the provider is collusive; at the end of this stage, a report on whether
the consumer has suffered the loss is made. If the provider is collusive, this report is the
result of the side-contract agreement. Otherwise, the report is h if and only if the consumer
has not suffered a loss. Finally, payments to the provider, transfers from the consumer, and
any recovery inputs are executed according to the selected policy and the report.
If the provider always reports truthfully (θ = 0), the insurer can rely on the provider’s
information and implement the first best. In contrast, if the provider is willing to write
side-contracts with a consumer with some probability (θ > 0), the first best is not imple-
mentable. Consider the first-best allocation: under state h, there is no recovery input, and the
consumer pays t∗h ; in state s, the consumer receives treatment m
∗
, pays t∗s and the provider
is reimbursed m∗c. From (1) and (2), we know that t∗h > t∗s . The provider’s net payoff is in-
dependent of the state and is equal to 0. This creates an incentive for the consumer–provider
coalition to avoid the higher payment in state h by reporting state s when the true state is h.
They will waste the recovery input, but this is not costly, since the provider is completely
reimbursed. Explicit attention must, therefore, be paid to the possibility of the formation
of side-contracts. As a benchmark, we begin our analysis with the standard assumption,
namely, the provider is collusive with probability 1. Results under this assumption will
then be compared with those in the more general case (0 < θ < 1), which we analyze
subsequently.
When a provider is always collusive, the insurer offers a single policy: {(ασh , tσh );
(ασs , t
σ
s ,m
σ )}. In this case, it can easily be proved that there is no loss of generality in re-
stricting attention to contracts which deter equilibrium side-contracts between the provider
and the consumer (see Tirole (1986)).
Definition 2 (Collusion-proof policies). A policy {(ασh , tσh ); (ασs , tσs ,mσ )} is said to be
collusion-proof if the following conditions are satisfied:
ασh − tσh ≥ ασs −mσc − tσs , (4)
ασs −mσc + f (mσ )− tσs ≥ ασh − tσh . (5)
Inequalities (4) and (5) ensure that the joint surplus from making a truthful report exceeds
the joint surplus from lying about the state of nature, in states h and s, respectively. For
later use, it is useful to note that both constraints cannot be violated simultaneously: if (4)
is violated, then (5) is satisfied, and vice versa.
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The insurer maximizes the expected utility of the consumer:
(1 − p)U(W − tσh )+ pU(W − + f (mσ )− tσs ), (6)
subject to the collusion-proofness constraints (4) and (5), as well as the participation con-
straints for the provider and the insurer’s break-even constraint:
ασh ≥ 0, (7)
ασs −mσc ≥ 0, (8)
(1 − p)(tσh − ασh )+ p(tσs − ασs ) ≥ 0. (9)
Proposition 1. When the provider is always collusive, the optimal collusion-proof policy
{(ασh , tσh ); (ασs , tσs ,mσ )} has the following properties:
1. The provider obtains zero profit: ασh = ασs −mσc = 0.
2. The consumer pays the same transfer in states h and s: tσs = tσh .
3. The consumer is imperfectly insured: W − + f (mσ )− tσs < W − tσh .
4. Recovery input is excessive relative to the first best: mσ > m∗, or f ′(mσ ) < c.
The policy in Proposition 1 will be referred to as the standard second-best policy. It has
two main features: insurance is imperfect, and the recovery input is excessive compared
to the first best. The intuition is as follows. As we pointed out above, given the first best,
the consumer and the provider have an incentive to report s when the true state is h. The
relevant (and binding) collusion-proofness constraint is, the one which ensures that the
consumer–provider coalition prefers reporting the truth in state h (constraint (4)). Two
options are available to make this constraint hold: either increase the payment to the provider
when he reports h, or reduce the difference between the transfers of the consumer to the
insurer tσh − tσs . The first option is suboptimal: if the payment to the provider is positive,
the expected utility of the consumer can be raised simply by decreasing this payment and
decreasing the consumer’s transfer to the insurer by the same amount. Hence, the provider
must get zero profit, and the optimal way to deter collusion is to reduce tσh − tσs to zero. In
other words, risk sharing through differences in monetary transfers across states h and s is
not optimal, and the recovery input is used as a substitute: it is increased from the first-best
level, mσ > m∗. Now we turn to the case where the provider colludes with the consumer
with probability θ , 0 < θ < 1.
3. Self-selection among providers
In this section, we assume that the insurer offers a contract consisting of a menu of two
policies: [{(ατh , tτh ); (ατs , tτs ,mτ )}, {(ασh , tσh ); (ασs , tσs ,mσ )}]. In stage 2, with the knowledge
of whether he is truthful or collusive, the provider picks a policy {(αjh , tjh ); (αjs , tjs ,mj )},
j = τ, σ . We assume that, independently of his type, the provider picks the policy that max-
imizes his expected utility, which is calculated according to what he anticipates will happen
in equilibrium in stage 4. That is, if he is a collusive provider, he will have to consider the
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possibility of side-contracts for the reporting of the information about the consumer’s loss. In
contrast, if he is an honest provider, he anticipates that he will reveal that information truth-
fully. The interpretation in the health insurance case is straightforward: although a physician
may have a high ethical standard while working (i.e. report the truth and avoid prescribing
treatment when unnecessary), he chooses the highest expected payment for doing so.
The two policies may be distinct and provide incentives for different types to self-select
in stage 2 of the game. But of course, the policies may also be identical. So there is no loss
of generality to consider only those equilibria of subgames starting at stage 2 in which the
j type provider picks {(αjh , tjh ); (αjs , tjs ,mj )}, j = τ, σ .
A first and crucial observation is that when the provider colludes with the consumer
with probability θ , it is no longer possible to consider only collusion-proof policies. Con-
sider a contract [{(ατh , tτh ); (ατs , tτs ,mτ )}, {(ασh , tσh ); (ασs , tσs ,mσ )}] that defines a subgame
at stage 2, and a continuation equilibrium, and suppose that {(ασh , tσh ); (ασs , tσs ,mσ )} is not
collusion-proof. Then the continuation equilibrium of the subgame may not be replicated
by a collusion-proof policy for the collusive type.
If {(ασh , tσh ); (ασs , tσs ,mσ )} is not collusion-proof, the collusive provider and the consumer
will find it optimal to lie in some state. At the beginning of stage 2, the collusive provider
then anticipates that his expected utility, denoted x, is strictly greater than his expected
utility if he was to report truthfully: x > y ≡ (1 − p)ασh + p(ασs −mσc). Because a type
τ provider does not write a side-contract, his expected utility is just y if he picks the σ
policy. Of course the τ policy will have to give him at least y in expected utility; say it gives
him exactly y. Now consider a collusion-proof contract that mimics the outcome of the
noncollusion-proof contract and, therefore, gives the same expected utilities to types σ and
τ of the provider. Since the new policy is collusion-proof, the type σ gets expected utility x
by reporting truthfully. So the type τ provider will also get expected utility x in equilibrium
(he can always pick the policy meant for type σ in stage 2). Therefore, the collusion-proof
policy cannot mimic the equilibrium of the subgame of the noncollusion-proof policy. We
have, thus, proved:12
Lemma 1. For θ ∈ (0, 1), a (continuation) equilibrium of a contract may not be a (con-
tinuation) equilibrium of a contract consisting only of collusion-proof policies.
The need to consider policies that permit the provider and consumer to lie about the
consumer’s loss stems from the existence of the honest provider. An honest provider will
not exploit a policy which is not collusion-proof. In other words, a policy that can be
manipulated by the collusive provider may give a higher profit to the collusive than to the
honest provider. The possibility of “differentially” rewarding different types of the provider
through a side-contract by the collusive type is the key to our analysis.13
Lemma 1 implies that we must consider contracts consisting of policies that may not be
collusion-proof. In most models in information economics, an incentive problem typically
12 Alger and Renault (1998) contains a similar argument in a different model.
13 Lemma 1 does not depend on the assumption that the provider gets all the potential gain from misreporting.
Indeed, if the provider earns any strictly positive share of the gain from a side-contract, the lemma continues to
hold.
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results in deterrence of misreporting of information. In contrast, our analysis must consider
allocations that are generated by the misrepresentation of information. Again, this is due to
our assumption that a player in our model may not want to exploit the superior information
he has in some subgame. In the next two subsections, we analyze two classes of contracts:
those which prevent collusion, and those which do not.
3.1. Optimal contract with collusion deterrence
Here we derive the optimal contract [{(ατh , tτh ); (ατs , tτs ,mτ )}, {(ασh , tσh ); (ασs , tσs ,mσ )}]
that deters collusion. In stage 4, the provider of type σ must not find it profitable to write a
side-contract, so constraints (4) and (5) must hold. Since the policies must allow the provider
to obtain his reservation utility in both states, we have the following participation constraints:
α
j
h ≥ 0, j = σ, τ, (10)
α
j
s −mjc ≥ 0, j = σ, τ. (11)
Next, we state the incentive constraints that guarantee self-selection for the two types
of the provider. In stage 2, the type j provider must find it optimal to select policy
{(αjh , tjh ); (αjs , tjs ,mj )}, j = τ, σ , anticipating the equilibrium moves in stage 4. Type
τ provider always reveals the true state in stage 4, regardless of the policy he has chosen.
Therefore, the incentive constraint for the truthful provider type is the following:
(1 − p)ατh + p(ατs −mτc) ≥ (1 − p)ασh + p(ασs −mσc), (12)
The condition for a collusive provider to choose the σ policy is slightly more involved.
Although the policy indexed by σ is collusion-proof, the policy indexed by τ may not be.
When a collusive provider selects the τ policy, he will consider any gain from a side-contract
at stage 4. Thus, if the state turns out to be h, he can either forgo the side-contract to obtain
ατh or use a side-contract to report s and get α
τ
s − mτc + tτh − tτs . Similarly, if the state is
s, the provider reports k = s (respectively, k = h) when ατs −mτc is greater (respectively,
smaller) than ατh − f (mτ ) + tτs − tτh . To summarize, the incentive constraint that ensures
that type σ provider picks the σ policy is:
(1 − p)ασh + p(ασs −mσc)≥ (1 − p)max[ατh , ατs −mτc + tτh − tτs ]
+p max[ατs −mτc, ατh − f (mτ )+ tτs − tτh ]. (13)
Finally, the insurer’s budget constraint is:
θ [(1−p)(tσh −ασh )+p(tσs −ασs )]+(1 − θ)[(1 − p)(tτh − ατh )+ p(tτs − ατs )] ≥ 0,
(14)
and the objective function is:
θ [(1 − p)U(W − tσh )+ pU(W − + f (mσ )− tσs )]
+ (1 − θ)[(1 − p)U(W − tτh )+ pU(W − + f (mτ )− tτs )]. (15)
An optimal contract deterring collusion maximizes (15) subject to (4), (5), (10)–(14).
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Proposition 2. Suppose 0 < θ < 1. The optimal contract deterring equilibrium collusion
is independent of θ and offers the same policy to the truthful and collusive types of provider.
In fact, this policy is the standard second-best policy of Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 says that if the contract must deter collusion, then the existence of the
truthful type of provider is inconsequential: the equilibrium contract is the same as if the
provider was collusive with certainty. Despite the fact that the τ type provider always reports
truthfully, he gets the optimal collusion-proof policy.
The key to understanding this result lies in the pair of inequalities (12) and (13). Given that
the contract deters collusion, the σ type provider cannot benefit from writing a side-contract
after choosing the σ policy, {(ασh , tσh ); (ασs , tσs ,mσ )}. Also, the collusive provider must not
find it attractive to pick the τ policy ({(ατh , tτh ); (ατs , tτs ,mτ )})—even if he can write a
side-contract on it: see inequality (13). Now, the truthful provider prefers the τ policy to
the σ policy—see inequality (12). But this must mean that when the truthful provider picks
the τ policy, even if he could write side-contracts, he would be unable to benefit. Indeed,
combining inequalities (13) and (12) yields:
(1 − p)ατh + p(ατs −mτc)
≥ (1−p)max[ατh , ατs −mτc+tτh−tτs ]+p max[ατs −mτc, ατh−f (mτ )+ tτs − tτh ],
which says that the τ policy is collusion proof: the right-hand side is the expected utility
for a provider when side-contracts can be written. Therefore, requiring the σ policy to be
collusion-proof implies that the τ policy must also be collusion-proof. Hence, the optimal
collusion-proof contract simply consists of the policy in Proposition 1 to both provider
types.
3.2. Optimal contract without collusion deterrence
In this subsection, we consider contracts [{(ατh , tτh ); (ατs , tτs ,mτ )}, {(ασh , tσh ); (ασs , tσs ,
mσ )}] for which the σ policy is not collusion-proof. As we noted in the discussion of
Definition 2, under a noncollusion-proof policy the provider–consumer coalition either
always reports state h or always reports state s. We will consider only those policies in
which the coalition always reports s, and verify later that this is optimal. So consider those
σ policies for which the joint surplus from reporting state s is greater than reporting state h
truthfully:
ασh − tσh < ασs −mσc − tσs . (16)
In state h the collusive provider offers a side-contract with the transfer x = tσh − tσs from
the consumer to the provider. Therefore, the provider’s utility is ασs −mσc+ tσh − tσs , and the
consumer’s utility remains at U(W − tσh ). In state s, the information is reported truthfully;
hence, the provider’s and the consumer’s utilities areασs −mσc andU(W−+f (mσ )−tσs ),
respectively. The objective function is the same as in the previous section:
θ [(1 − p)U(W − tσh )+ pU(W − + f (mσ )− tσs )]
+ (1 − θ)[(1 − p)U(W − tτh )+ pU(W − + f (mτ )− tτs )]. (17)
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As before, the provider must obtain his reservation utility:
ατh ≥ 0, (18)
α
j
s −mjc ≥ 0 j = σ, τ. (19)
Notice that since in equilibrium ασh is not chosen by type σ provider in state h, we do not
impose a lower bound on it. The budget constraint for the insurer is modified:
θ(tσs − ασs )+ (1 − θ)[(1 − p)(tτh − ατh )+ p(tτs − ατs )] ≥ 0. (20)
When the provider’s type is σ , the recovery input will be used with probability 1; this
explains the first term of (20), which says that the transfer collected from the consumer is
always tσs while the payment to the provider is always ασs .
Finally, the self-selection constraints for the provider are as follows. For the truthful
provider:
(1 − p)ατh + p(ατs −mτc) ≥ (1 − p)max[ασh , 0] + p(ασs −mσc). (21)
Because we have not required ασh ≥ 0, we allow for the possibility that the truthful
provider refuses the transfer in state h if he has picked the σ policy. Next, using the infor-
mation on the collusive provider’s equilibrium utility from the optimal side-contract, we
can determine his expected utility if he selects the σ policy:
(1 − p)(ασs −mσc − tσs + tσh )+ p(ασs −mσc).
The incentive constraint for type σ provider is:
ασs −mσc + (1 − p)(tσh − tσs )
≥ (1−p)max[ατh , ατs −mτc+tτh−tτs ]+p max[ατs −mτc, ατh − f (mτ )+ tτs − tτh ].
(22)
Similar to (13), the right-hand side takes into account the possibility of collusion when the
collusive provider picks the policy that is meant for the truthful provider.
The contract [{(ατh , tτh ); (ατs , tτs ,mτ )}, {(ασh , tσh ); (ασs , tσs ,mσ )}] which maximizes (17)
subject to constraints (18)–(22) is described in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Given that the policy {(ασh , tσh ); (ασs , tσs ,mσ )} is not collusion-proof, the
optimal contract has the following properties:
1. The truthful provider obtains zero profit: ατh = ατs −mτc = 0.
2. In state s, the collusive provider reports k = s and obtains zero profit: ασs −mσc = 0;
in state h, he reports k = s and obtains profit tσh − tσs ≥ 0 through a side-payment from
the consumer.
3. The consumer is imperfectly insured, whether matched with a truthful or a collusive
provider: W − + f (mj )− tjs < W − tjh , j = σ, τ .
4. When the provider is truthful, recovery input is excessive relative to the first best: mτ >
m∗; when the provider is collusive, the recovery input is smaller than in the first best:
mσ < m∗.
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Given that the collusive provider always reports s,14 recovery inputs are used even when
they have no value. For this reason, the level of recovery input must be reduced from the
first best when the consumer is matched with a collusive provider. And maintaining full
insurance under a reduced recovery input is too costly, so a consumer who is matched with
a collusive provider must face some risk. The truthful provider does not exploit the mis-
reporting incentive. Nevertheless, first-best risk-sharing is still not optimal for a consumer
who is matched with a truthful provider. This is due to the fact that the collusive provider
earns a rent tσh − tσs which is equal to tτh − tτs by the binding incentive constraint (22). Hence,
to limit the rent to the collusive provider, tτh − tτs is reduced from the first best. Given the
lack of full insurance, it is optimal to raise the recovery input from the first-best level to
reduce the amount of risk faced by the consumer matched with a truthful provider. This is
reminiscent of the regular second-best policy, where treatment is also used as a substitute
for monetary compensation (see Proposition 1).
As mentioned in the introduction, the result in the above proposition differs from that
in Alger and Renault (1998): given that the principal’s utility does not depend directly on
the agent’s type, they find that the principal offers the first-best contract to both the honest
and the dishonest agents when the dishonest agent’s type is not revealed in equilibrium.
In their model, when the dishonest agent lies in equilibrium, it is as if the dishonest agent
was of one particular type with probability 1. As a result, the principal sets the decision
variable to its first-best level conditional on that type: offering the first-best contract also
to the honest agent then does not violate the dishonest agent’s incentive constraint. In our
model it is not optimal to do so, because of the insurance motive: even though the dishonest
provider always claims that the patient is in the sick state, the consumer’s utility is not the
same in the healthy and the sick states. Moreover the treatment is unproductive when the
consumer is healthy. Therefore, it is not optimal to set the treatment level and the payments
to their first-best levels when the consumer is matched with a collusive provider; in order to
satisfy the incentive constraint (22) the contract for the honest provider then also has to be
distorted.
3.3. The equilibrium contract
To determine the equilibrium contract, we compare the consumer’s expected utilities
from the optimal collusion-proof and noncollusion-proof contracts. In contrast with the
collusion-proof contract of Proposition 2, the values of the variables in the τ -policy in
Proposition 3 vary with θ (this is readily seen by examining the first-order conditions). In
fact, as θ goes to zero from above, the optimal policy for the truthful type tends towards the
first-best policy.
14 Note that condition (16) must hold for this to be true. For small values of θ (the likelihood of the collusive type
being small), we can show that tτh − tτs = tσh − tσs > 0, so that (16) indeed is satisfied. Note further that a simple
revealed preference argument can be used to verify that the insurer could not do better by offering some contract
[{(ατh , tτh ); (ατs , tτs ,mτ )}, {(ασh , tσh ); (ασs , tσs ,mσ )}] such that the collusive provider always reports h. Note that for
such a contract, no recovery input is used when the consumer is in state s and is matched with a collusive provider.
Hence, it must be dominated by the one considered above: indeed, in the contract above, mσ = 0 could have been
chosen, but was not.
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Corollary 1. As θ tends to 0, the optimal policy for the truthful type provider tends to
the first-best policy: limθ→0{(ατh , tτh ); (ατs , tτs ,mτ )} = {(α∗h , t∗h ); (α∗s , t∗s ,m∗)}. Moreover,
tτh > t
τ
s (so that (16) is satisfied).
Corollary 1 and Proposition 3 together say that the distortion of the τ policy changes in a
strictly monotonic way as θ , the probability for a collusive provider, begins to increase from
0. When θ = 0, the insurer offers the first-best policy to the truthful provider, the insurer
bears all the risks, and production is efficient. As θ increases from 0, it is optimal to depart
from the first best in order to reduce the collusive provider’s rent and production inefficiency
that result from the side-contract between the collusive provider and the consumer. This
follows from the Envelope Theorem. Because risk sharing and production are efficient in
the first-best policy, reducing the difference between tτs and tτh and increasing the recovery
input mτ slightly leads to a second-order loss, but this results in a first-order gain because
the collusive provider’s incentive constraint is relaxed. When θ begins to increase from 0,
the equilibrium contract must begin to adjust. Therefore, although the first-best policy is
feasible for the truthful provider, it is not offered in equilibrium. However, the policy for the
truthful provider is approximately first-best when θ is in the neighborhood of zero. Note that
this implies that allowing collusion must outperform deterring collusion when θ is small.
Next we turn to the case when θ is close to 1. Here, the rent to the collusive provider
becomes large, as does the waste of the recovery input due to the misreporting in state
h. Furthermore, the expected benefit to the consumer of the truthful provider’s behavior
becomes small. The overall benefit from allowing collusion, thus, becomes small. Not
surprisingly, when θ is large enough, it is better to deter collusion than to allow it.
Corollary 2. For all θ sufficiently close to 1, the contract in Proposition 3 has tσh − tσs =
tτh − tτs = 0. That is, it satisfies the collusion-proofness constraints in Definition 2.
Corollary 2 implies that for θ sufficiently close to 1, the optimal noncollusion-proof policy
must give the consumer a lower expected utility than the optimal collusion-proof policy.
Therefore, for these values of θ , the equilibrium contract must be the collusion-proof contract
in Proposition 2. We have been unable to show that the value of the objective function at
the solution of the program for the optimal noncollusion-proof contract is monotonic in
θ . So for intermediate values of θ (those not in the neighborhood of 0 or 1), we cannot
characterize conditions for which the equilibrium contract is the collusion-proof contract in
Proposition 2, or the noncollusion-proof contract in Proposition 3. Nevertheless, we suspect
that the noncollusion-proof contract is the equilibrium contract if and only if θ is below a
certain threshold. To summarize our results, we have:
Proposition 4. When the probability of the provider acting collusively is sufficiently small,
the equilibrium contract consists of policies that do not deter collusion; in equilibrium,
the collusive provider writes a side-contract with the consumer, while the truthful provider
is given a policy that is approximately first best. When the probability of the provider
acting collusively is sufficiently high, the equilibrium contract consists of the equilibrium
collusion-proof policy (independent of θ ) as if the provider were always collusive, namely
the contract in Proposition 1.
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The intuition for why the equilibrium contract is independent of θ once it is close to 1
is this. Suppose θ is equal to 1, clearly, the equilibrium contract is collusion-proof. Now,
let θ decrease from 1 slightly. If the contract is now changed slightly, so that it is no longer
collusion-proof, a side-contract will be written and the collusive type will always report
state s. This results in a waste of the treatment in state h. Put differently, changing from
the collusion-proof to a noncollusion-proof policy for θ close to 1 results in a discrete
decrease in the payoff. So departing from the collusion-proof contract for θ close to 1 is
suboptimal.
4. Two types of provider, one single policy
For completeness and comparison, we now consider a regime in which the insurer offers
one single policy, {(αh, th); (αs, ts,m)}. Screening menus are ruled out in this section. The
analysis turns out to be much simpler. Clearly, the policy must be either collusion-proof or
not. If it is collusion-proof, the optimal policy is the standard second-best policy. We only
need to determine the optimal noncollusion-proof policy, and again, we only need to consider
those policies where the consumer–provider coalition always reports s. So condition (16)
must hold. The consumer’s expected utility is independent of the provider type and it is:
(1 − p)U(W − th)+ pU(W − + f (m)− ts). (23)
The participation constraints for the provider and the insurer’s budget constraint are:
αh ≥ 0, (24)
αs − mc ≥ 0, (25)
(1 − θ)(1 − p)(th − αh)+ [θ + (1 − θ)p](ts − αs) ≥ 0. (26)
All three constraints are binding, and they can be solved to replace αh, αs and th in the
objective function. The first-order conditions with respect to m and ts are, respectively:(
p + θ
1 − θ
)
U ′(W − th)c = pU′(W − + f (m)− ts)f ′(m), (27)
(
p + θ
1 − θ
)
U ′(W − th) = pU′(W − + f (m)− ts). (28)
Simplification shows that these conditions imply:
Proposition 5. If a single noncollusion-proof policy is offered, the optimal policy satisfies:
1. Unless θ = 0 the consumer is imperfectly insured: W − + f (m)− ts < W − th.
2. The recovery input is at the first-best level: m = m∗.
3. The truthful provider obtains zero profit: αh = αs − mc = 0.
4. In state s, the collusive provider reports k = s and obtains zero profit: αs − mc = 0; in
state h, he reports k = s and obtains profit th − ts ≥ 0 through a side-payment from the
consumer.
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In the previous section, we found that with a noncollusion-proof menu of policies, there
was under-treatment if the provider was collusive and over-treatment if he was honest.
Here, it turns out that the level of treatment is always first best. It can be explained by two
differences: here, the consumer’s utility does not depend on whether the provider is honest
or dishonest; furthermore, there is no leeway in adjusting the amount of treatment according
to the type of provider. However, in order to limit the payment to the collusive provider,
the difference between the payments th and ts is reduced compared to the first-best policy,
resulting in imperfect insurance.15
To determine the equilibrium contract, we compare the consumer’s expected utilities
from the optimal collusion-proof and noncollusion-proof contracts. With the former, the
expected utility is independent of θ . Furthermore:
Corollary 3. If the policy is not collusion-proof, the expected utility of the consumer is
strictly decreasing in θ .
Proof. Since m = m∗ for all θ , the expected transfer from the consumer to the insurer
increases with θ . Furthermore, condition (28) implies that the difference between W − th
and W − + f (m)− ts increases as θ increases. 
Moreover, when θ is close to one, the standard second-best policy dominates the optimal
noncollusion-proof policy. Thus, we have proved:
Proposition 6. If a single policy is offered, there exists θˆ such that:
(i) if θ ≤ θˆ , the equilibrium policy is the optimal noncollusion-proof policy in Proposition
5;
(ii) if θ > θˆ , the equilibrium policy is the standard second-best collusion-proof policy in
Proposition 1.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have characterized the equilibrium insurance-payment contracts when
the consumer–provider coalition may sometimes file false claims with the insurer. Our
focus has been on the risk sharing and treatment efficiency properties. We have explored
two possibilities: either the insurer offers a menu of policies to screen the prospective
providers, or it offers a single policy. Restricting attention to single policies leads to a loss
of generality, and lower welfare. In both cases, however, allowing collusion turns out to be
optimal when the coalition will falsify claims with small probabilities. When menus are
used by the insurer, the equilibrium treatment level is higher than the first best when it is
supplied by the honest provider; lower, when supplied by the dishonest provider. Insurance
is never perfect, and the consumer must face some risks. The use of monetary transfers to
15 An interesting implication of this result is that production efficiency obtains when insurance is provided with
positive loading: indeed, the problem can be interpreted as a standard insurance problem with positive loading. To
see this, choose λ ≡ (θ(1 − p)/p) as the loading factor.
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compensate the consumer’s loss not recovered by treatment only occurs when collusion
is tolerated. When an insurance and payment contract is designed, it is important that the
interaction between consumers and providers be understood properly. As we have shown,
the nature of this interaction—collusive or honest—determines the optimal design critically.
When the insurer is unable to screen the providers by offering a menu of policies, a
simple monotonicity results obtains: collusion is tolerated if and only if the provider is
dishonest with a sufficiently low probability (see the very last proposition). We have been
unsuccessful in obtaining a similar monotonicity result when the insurer is able to use
menus of policies. There remains the possibility that there are multiple equilibrium switches
between collusion-proof and noncollusion-proof policies as the probability of the provider
being dishonest varies, although we have been unable to construct such an example.
Our paper is one of the few in the insurance and health economics literature that explicitly
models agents who are not completely self-interested. It seems likely that this framework
will shed light on many institutions and phenomena, and future research in this direction
may prove fruitful.
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Appendix A
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1
Obviously, (9) is binding at the optimum; otherwise, tσs and tσh could be reduced. Also, (7)
binds; otherwise, ασh and t
σ
h could be reduced by the same amount. An identical argument
establishes that (8) binds. We have proved 1 in Proposition 1. With ασh = 0 = ασs −mσc,
and with (9) binding, the problem becomes: choose tσh , tσs , and mσ to maximize (6) subject
to:
(1 − p)tσh + p(tσs −mσc) = 0, (A.1)
−tσh ≥ −tσs , (A.2)
f (mσ )− tσs ≥ −tσh . (A.3)
Constraint (A.2) binds. If it did not, tσh could be increased and tσs decreased (in proportions
such that (A.1) is unaffected). Such a change would not violate (A.3), but would decrease
the difference between W − tσh and W − + f (mσ )− tσs , since f (mσ ) < . This proves
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2 of the proposition. Now when tσh = tσs , 3 of the proposition follows from the assumption
of f (m) < .
Further, the binding constraint (A.2) implies that (A.3) is satisfied as a strict inequality.
Substituting the binding constraint (A.2) into (A.1), we have tσh = pmσ c. Putting this into
the objective function, we have reduced the problem to the maximization of
(1 − p)U(W − tσh )+ pU(W − + f (mσ )− tσh ),
subject to
tσh = pmσ c.
Let λ be the Lagrange multiplier. The first-order conditions for tσh and m
σ are, respec-
tively:
(1 − p)U ′(W − tσh )+ pU′(W − + f (mσ )− tσh ) = λ,
pU′(W − + f (mσ )− tσh )f ′(mσ ) = λpc.
Combining the above, we have
U ′(W − + f (mσ )− tσh )
(1 − p)U ′(W − tσh )+ pU′(W − + f (mσ )− tσh )
f ′(mσ ) = c.
Since  < f (mσ ) andU is concave, the fraction in the above expression is >1. Therefore,
f ′(mσ ) < c. This proves 4 of the proposition.
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2
First, constraints (12) and (13) together imply:
ατh − tτh ≥ ατs −mτc − tτs , (A.4)
ατs −mτc + f (mτ )− tτs ≥ ατh − tτh , (A.5)
which are equivalent to collusion-proofness constraints for the truthful provider. So adding
these two constraints into the program is inconsequential.
Next, we relax the program by dropping (12) and (13); we will show that they are satisfied
at the solution of the relaxed program. So the relaxed program is the maximization of (15)
subject to (4), (5), (A.4), (A.5), (10) and (11) and the budget constraint (14).
For the relaxed program, constraints (10) and (11) bind; this follows an argument similar
to the one in the proof of Proposition 1. So we can substitute (10) and (11) as equalities
to the other constraints and eliminate the α variables. Furthermore, the missing constraints
(12) and (13) are satisfied once the constraints (10) and (11) have been shown to be binding.
So we know that the solution to the relaxed program is the solution to the original problem.
After having substituted for the α variables, we rewrite the constraints:
−tσh ≥ −tσs , (A.6)
f (mσ )− tσs ≥ −tσh , (A.7)
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−tτh ≥ −tτs , (A.8)
f (mτ )− tτs ≥ −tτh , (A.9)
θ [(1 − p)tσh + p(tσs −mσc)] + (1 − θ)[(1 − p)tτh + p(tτs −mτc)] ≥ 0. (A.10)
Following a now familiar argument, constraints (A.6) and (A.8) are binding; as a result,
constraints (A.7) and (A.9) are satisfied with slack. Now use (A.6) and (A.8) as equalities to
substitute into (A.10) and the objective function. So we simplify the program into choosing
tσh , m
σ
, tτh , and m
τ to maximize
θ [(1 − p)U(W − tσh )+ pU(W − + f (mσ )− tσh )]
+ (1 − θ)[(1 − p)U(W − tτh )+ pU(W − + f (mτ )− tτh )],
subject to
θ(tσh − pmσ c)+ (1 − θ)(tτh − pmτ c) ≥ 0.
The proposition follows from comparing the first-order conditions of this program to those
in the proof of Proposition 1.
A.3. Proof of Proposition 3
We begin by assuming that ατh − tτh < ατs − mτc − tτs . We will later consider the other
possibility. Then, constraint (22) reduces to:
ασs −mσc + (1 − p)(tσh − tσs ) ≥ ατs −mτc + (1 − p)(tτh − tτs ). (A.11)
First note that we can set ασh = 0. We next show that (19) for j = τ is binding. Suppose
that it does not bind. Then we can reduce ατs , while increasing ατh so as to leave the left-hand
sides of (20) and (21) unaffected. Constraint (A.11) has been relaxed by the decrease of
ατs . Hence, tσh can be decreased. Since t
σ
h is absent from the other constraints, these are not
affected. This results in an increase of the expected utility. Next, we show that for j = σ
(19) is binding. Suppose that it is not binding. Then, we can increase mσ . For instance,
increase mσc by  > 0 and sufficiently small. This relaxes constraint (21), so that ατh can
be decreased by (p/(1 − p)). By (20), tτh can then also be decreased by (p/(1 − p)).
This in turn implies that the right-hand side of constraint (A.11) decreases by . Since the
left-hand side was also decreased by , this constraint remains unaffected. But the expected
utility has increased, sincemσ has been increased, and tτh has been decreased. Given that the
constraints (19) for j = τ and for σ are binding, constraint (21) is redundant. Last, we show
that constraint (18) must bind. Indeed, if it did not, ατh could be decreased. By (20), tτh could
then be decreased, thus, raising the expected utility. We have, therefore, proved 1 and 2.
Using (18) and (19) as equalities to substitute for the α variables, we simplify the budget
constraint (20) and the incentive constraint for the collusive provider (A.11) to:
θ(tσs −mσc)+ (1 − θ)[(1 − p)tτh + p(tτs −mτc)] ≥ 0, (A.12)
tσh − tσs ≥ tτh − tτs . (A.13)
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Constraint (A.13) must bind, since otherwise tσh could be decreased; this does not affect
the budget constraint and increases the expected utility. Similarly, the budget constraint
is binding. Using (A.13) to substitute for tσh and letting λ be the multiplier for constraint
(A.12), the solution is characterized by the first-order conditions with respect to mτ , tτs , tτh ,
mσ and tσs :
p(1 − θ)U ′(W − + f (mτ )− tτs )f ′(mτ ) = λ(1 − θ)pc, (A.14)
p(1 − θ)U ′(W − + f (mτ )− tτs )− θ(1 − p)U ′(W − tσh ) = λ(1 − θ)p, (A.15)
(1 − θ)(1 − p)U ′(W − tτh )+ θ(1 − p)U ′(W − tσh ) = λ(1 − θ)(1 − p), (A.16)
θpU′(W − + f (mσ )− tσs )f ′(mσ ) = λθc, (A.17)
θ(1 − p)U ′(W − tσh )+ θpU′(W − + f (mσ )− tσs ) = λθ. (A.18)
Conditions (A.17) and (A.18) together imply:
pU′(W − + f (mσ )− tσs )
pU′(W − + f (mσ )− tσs )+ (1 − p)U ′(W − tσh )
f ′(mσ ) = c,
which implies that f ′(mσ ) > c, or mσ < m∗. Next we show that mτ > m∗. Adding (A.15)
and (A.16) yields:
pU′(W − + f (mτ )− tτs )+ (1 − p)U ′(W − tτh ) = λ. (A.19)
This and (A.14) imply:
U ′(W − + f (mτ )− tτs )
pU′(W − + f (mτ )− tτs )+ (1 − p)U ′(W − tτh )
f ′(mτ ) = c. (A.20)
Getting an expression for λ from (A.16) and substituting it into (A.19), we obtain:
p[U ′(W − + f (mτ )− tτs )− U ′(W − tτh )] =
θ
1 − θ U
′(W − tσh ) > 0.
So we conclude that U ′(W−+f (mτ )− tτs ) > U ′(W− tτh ), implying that the consumer is
imperfectly insured against the risk of losing  when he is matched with a truthful provider.
Furthermore, this together with (A.19) implies that mτ > m∗. Thus, we have proved 4.
We now compare the differences of the consumer’s net wealth between states h and
s, when he is matched with a collusive provider, and when he is matched with a truthful
provider. These differences are, respectively:
W − tσh −W + − f (mσ )+ tσs = − f (mσ )+ tσs − tσh ,
and
W − tτh −W + − f (mτ )+ tτs = − f (mτ )+ tτs − tτh .
Since mσ < mτ , and tτs − tτh = tσs − tσh , the former expression is greater than the latter.
So we have
− f (mσ )+ tσs − tσh > − f (mτ )+ tτs − tτh > 0,
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where the last inequality follows from the fact that U ′(W −+f (mτ )− tτs ) > U ′(W − tτh ).
So we have proved 3 of the proposition.
Finally, we verify that we need not consider τ policies that do not verify ατh − tτh <
ατs − mτc − tτs (see the assumption at the beginning of the proof). Consider the opposite
case: ατh − tτh ≥ ατs − mτc − tτs . In words, the joint surplus in state h is higher when
the truth is reported. If also ατs − mτc + f (mτ ) − tτs ≥ ατh − tτh , then the τ policy is
collusion-proof, and trivially, the optimal contract would then be the one in Proposition 2
(the optimal collusion-proof contract).
Hence, we need only consider contracts such that the ατh − tτh ≥ ατs − mτc − tτs
and ατs − mτc + f (mτ ) − tτs < ατh − tτh : the collusive provider would always report h
if he were to pick the τ policy. The incentive constraint for the collusive provider (22)
would be:
ασs −mσc + (1 − p)(tσh − tσs ) ≥ ατh . (A.21)
It is straightforward to show that all the individual rationality constraints (18) and (19)
bind. Hence, (A.21) becomes tσh − tσs ≥ 0. Since this must be binding at any optimum
(otherwise tσh could be decreased without affecting any constraint), the collusive provider’s
policy is in fact collusion-proof, contradicting the assumption that it is not collusion-proof,
i.e. that tσh − tσs > 0.
A.4. Proof of Corollary 1
Setting θ = 0 in (A.14)–(A.16), we have
U ′(W − + f (mτ )− tτs ) = U ′(W − tσh ),
and
f ′(mτ ) = c.
Furthermore, the budget constraint becomes (1 − p)tτh + p(tτs − mτc) = 0, so that
the policy is exactly first best. Obviously (16) is satisfied. The corollary follows from the
upper-semicontinuity of the solutions to the constrained maximization program.
A.5. Proof of Corollary 2
Let tτh − tτs = tσh − tσs ≡ k. The program for Proposition 3 can be rewritten as the
maximization of
θ [(1 − p)U(W − k − tσs )+ pU(W − + f (mσ )− tσs )]
+ (1 − θ)[(1 − p)U(W − k − tτs )+ pU(W − + f (mτ )− tτs )],
subject to k ≥ 0 and
θ(tσs −mσc)+ (1 − θ)(tτs + (1 − p)k − pmτ c) = 0.
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Letting µ and λ be the multipliers of the two constraints, we obtain the first-order con-
ditions with respect to tσs , tτs , k, mσ and mτ , respectively:
(1 − p)U ′(W − k − tσs )+ pU′(W − + f (mσ )− tσs ) = λ,
(1 − p)U ′(W − k − tτs )+ pU′(W − + f (mτ )− tτs ) = λ,
θ(1 − p)U ′(W − k − tσs )+ (1 − θ)(1 − p)U ′(W − k − tτs ) = λ(1−θ)(1−p)+µ,
pU′(W − + f (mσ )− tσs )f ′(mσ ) = λc,
U ′(W − + f (mτ )− tτs )f ′(mτ ) = λc.
For the contract to be noncollusion-proof, the constraint k ≥ 0 must not bind, i.e. we
must have µ = 0. Replacing λ of the third constraint by the left-hand side of the second
constraint, and rearranging we get:
θ(1 − p)U ′(W − k − tσs )
= (1 − θ)(1 − p)p[U ′(W − + f (mτ )− tτs )− U ′(W − k − tτs )] + µ.
As θ tends to 1, the first term on the right-hand side tends to 0. The left-hand side being
positive, we must have µ > 0.
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